Published 2007
Table of Contents:
“…6.8 The Theoretically Informed (and Human) eBay Bidder -- 6.8.1 Simply a Mistake: Bidding Untruthfully in Vickrey's Setting -- 6.8.2 The Winner's Curse -- 6.8.3 Lessons from the Failures of Revenue Equivalence -- 6.8.4 Spiteful Behavior -- 6.8.5 Wars, Frenzies, and Bubbles -- 6.9 Questions -- Chapter Seven · Transgressions -- 7.1 Shills -- 7.1.1 Shill Bidding and Theory -- 7.1.2 Mock Auctions: The More Important Diamond -- 7.2 Bidder Rings:
84 Charing Cross Road -- 7.3 Ethics -- 7.3.1 The Twinge of Guilt: The Buyer Withholds Information -- 7.3.2 Conversely: The Seller Withholds Information -- 7.3.3 Sniping -- 7.3.4 Shadowing Bidders -- 7.3.5 The Ethics of Feedback -- 7.3.6 Exporting and Importing Ancient Artifacts -- 7.4 A Note on Downright Fraud -- 7.5 Fakes -- 7.6 Questions -- Chapter Eight · Epilogue -- 8.1 Looking Back -- 8.2 Looking Ahead -- Appendix A: Vickrey's Genesis -- A.1 Introduction -- A.2 A Preview of Revenue Equivalence -- A.3 * Quick Review of Some Probability Theory -- A.4 * Order Statistics -- A.5 Revenue of Second-Price Auctions -- A.6 First-Price Auctions and Nash Equilibria -- A.7 Revenue Equivalence of First- and Second-Price Auctions with Uniformly Distributed Values -- A.8 A Nash Equilibrium for First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- A.9 Revenue of First-Price Auctions -- A.10 * Conditional Expectation -- A.11 An Interpretation of First-Price Equilibrium Bidding Strategy -- A.12 Stronger Revenue Equivalence -- A.13 Dutch Auctions and Strategic Equivalence -- A.14 Another Kind of Auction-the All-Pay Auction -- A.15 Questions -- Appendix B: Riley and Samuelson's Optimal Auctions -- B.1 Definition of Riley and Samuelson's Class -- B.2 Revenue -- B.3 Optimal Reserve Price -- B.3.1 Example: First-Price Auction with Reserve -- B.3.2 Example: Second-Price Auction with Reserve -- B.4 Sad Losers and Santa Claus.…”
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