Mental reality /
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Corporate Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
c2010.
|
| Edition: | 2nd ed., with a new appendix. |
| Series: | Representation and mind.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | CONNECT |
Table of Contents:
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Default position
- 1.2 Experience
- 1.3 The character of experience
- 1.4 Understanding-experience
- 1.5 Note about dispositional mental states
- 1.6 Purely experiential content
- 1.7 Account of four seconds of thought
- 2 Three questions
- 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Mental and the nonmental
- 2.3 Mental and the publicly observable
- 2.4 Mental and the behavioral
- 2.5 Neobehaviorism and reductionism
- 2.6 Naturalism in the philosophy of mind
- 2.7 Conclusion: The three questions
- 3 Agnostic materialism, part 1 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Monism
- 3.3 Linguistic argument
- 3.4 Materialism and M & P monism
- 3.5 Comment on reduction
- 3.6 Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology"
- 3.7 Asymmetry and reduction
- 3.8 Equal-status monism
- 3.9 Panpsychism
- 3.10 Inescapability of metaphysics
- 4 Agnostic materialism, part 2
- 4.1 Ignorance
- 4.2 Sensory spaces
- 4.3 Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration
- 4.4 Hard part of the mind-body problem
- 4.5 Neutral monism and agnostic monism
- 4.6 Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on 4.7 Conclusion-- 5 Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism
- 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Mentalism
- 5.3 Strict or pure process idealism
- 5.4 Active-principle idealism
- 5.5 Stuff idealism
- 5.6 Immaterialism
- 5.7 Positions restated
- 5.8 Dualist options
- 5.9 Summary 5.10 Frege's thesis
- 5.11 Objections to pure process idealism
- 5.12 Problem of mental dispositions
- 6 'Mental'
- 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Shared abilities?
- 6.3 Sorting ability
- 6.4 Definition of 'mental being'
- 6.6 Mental phenomena
- 6.7 View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena
- 7 Natural intentionality 7.1 Introduction-- 7.2 E/C intentionality
- 7.3 Experienceless
- 7.4 Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects
- 7.5 Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality
- 7.6 Concepts in nature
- 7.7 Intentionality and experience
- 7.8 Summary with problem 7.9 Conclusion-- 8 Pain and 'pain' 8.1 Introduction-- 8.2 Neobehaviorist view
- 8.3 Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior
- 8.4 Challenge
- 8.5 Sirians
- 8.6 N.N.'s novel
- 8.7 Objection to the Sirians
- 8.8 Betelgeuzians
- 8.9 Point of the Sirians
- 8.10 Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain
- 8.11 Unpleasantness and qualitative character
- 9 Weather watchers 9.1 Introduction-- 9.2 Rooting story
- 9.3 What is it like to be a weather watcher?
- 9.4 Aptitudes of mental states
- 9.5 Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space
- 9.6 Argument from the conditions for language ability
- 9.7 Argument from the nature of desire
- 9.8 Desire and affect
- 9.9 Argument from the phenomenology of desire
- 10 Behavior 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Hopeless definition
- 10.3 Difficulties
- 10.4 Other-observability
- 10.5 Neo-neobehaviorism
- 11 Concept of mind.
